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OVERVIEW
In 2010, and although GDP fell by 0.1 % over the year on average as a result of the carry-
over effects of the previous year’s declines in output, the Spanish economy initiated a very 
sluggish and hesitant recovery amid the sovereign debt crisis in Europe. The situation cre-
ated poses most considerable future challenges. These involve ensuring the success of 
the fiscal consolidation programme, the completion of the far-reaching restructuring and 
recapitalisation of the financial system, and the implementation of structural reforms ena-
bling imbalances to be fully corrected and that would set the economy once more on a 
path of sustained long-term growth.
The ongoing recovery in the economy continued last year and in 2011 to date, accompa-
nied by a progressive normalisation of the financial markets which, however, were not free 
from bouts of instability. Of particular note were the episodes on the euro area sovereign 
debt markets, which have posed the biggest challenge to the common European project 
since its creation. Inflation has been moving on a rising trend, despite starting from moder-
ate levels in the case of the advanced economies. The acceleration in prices has been 
largely linked to the cost of commodities and, in the case of the emerging economies, to 
greater demand-side pressures, too. This tendency has been more evident since Decem-
ber, due to the sharp rise in oil prices resulting from the political instability in the North 
African and Middle Eastern countries.
The 5 % increase in world output in 2010, following the 0.6 % decline in 2009, encom-
passes very different growth rates across the various geographical regions. The emerg-
ing economies, which had been less affected by the financial crisis, picked up more 
rapidly, with a 7.2 % increase in GDP. This headway was largely domestic demand-led 
and began to be manifest in certain signs of overheating and inflationary pressures. The 
advanced economies, meanwhile, posted growth rates of around 3 %, largely under-
pinned by inventories and public-sector support to demand. That said, fragility per-
sisted in certain sectors, such as the real estate and financial industries, and the labour 
market was lacklustre. Standard indicators continue to show a relatively wide output 
gap, which helps explain the contained course of core inflation. Yet within this group of 
economies there have also been significant differences. In particular, the recovery is 
moving at a slower pace in Europe, with GDP growth of 1.7 % in the euro area in 2010 
and of 1.4 % in the United Kingdom, in contrast to the greater dynamism of the United 
States and Japan (2.9 % and 4 %, respectively; see Chart 1.1). Even within the euro 
area there were significant differences in economic activity across the Member States, 
with vigorous GDP growth in Germany and Finland and significant declines in Greece 
and Ireland. 
Over the course of 2010 there was notable disparity in the economic policy stances ap-
plied, reflecting the differences in the cyclical position of the economies in question, the 
various constraints on their economic policies and the diversity in the assessment of the 
risks that expansionary measures entail. Regarding monetary policy, the United States 
adopted further unconventional stimulus measures based on enlarging the Federal Re-
serve’s balance sheet by means of the direct purchase of – essentially government – se-
curities. This quantitative easing strategy, set in train at the outset of the crisis, was added 
to with a further programme of staggered purchases for a value of $600 billion (QE II) to 
combat deflationary risks and the signs of weakness that emerged in mid-2010. In the euro 
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area, monetary policy remained accommodative, but no additional expansionary meas-
ures were implemented. Some of the exceptional measures adopted beforehand have 
gradually been withdrawn; however, given the major tensions on euro area sovereign debt 
markets, the Securities Market Programme was set up, centred on the purchase of the 
government bonds of the countries most affected by these tensions so as to preserve the 
efficiency of the monetary policy transmission mechanism. Conversely, among the emerg-
ing economies, adopting a contractionary stance prevailed in response to growing infla-
tionary pressures, a stance which, in some cases, clashed with a reluctance to let the ex-
change rate float sufficiently freely.
The differences have proven particularly significant in the fiscal policy arena. In the Unit-
ed States and Japan, the continuing priority was to provide support mechanisms for the 
recovery, which took the form of new fiscal stimulus plans in both countries. The US 
budget deficit is thus expected to have stood at around 10 % of GDP at end-2010, with 
public debt close to 100 % of GDP. Conversely, both in the United Kingdom and in the 
euro area, vigorous fiscal consolidation processes were undertaken. In the case of the 
euro area, sovereign debt market tensions clearly put the focus on the risks inherent in a 
widespread situation of excessive deficits in the Member States, obliging members to 
take ambitious and swift corrective measures to quell investor doubts over the sustain-
ability of public finances. These doubts, however, did not spread to economies such as 
the United States or the United Kingdom, despite the large scale of the deficit and pub-
lic debt in both cases. 
… and, especially, fiscal policy
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The projections available suggest a central scenario for the world economy in which 
growth will continue to firm over the next two years, at a slightly lower rate than in 2010 but 
on sounder foundations. This would come about essentially from the application of eco-
nomic policies whose stance will, broadly, be more contractionary, though not so in the 
United States. The heterogeneity across geographical areas which characterised the be-
haviour of GDP last year would be maintained in this scenario.
It is also likely, according to these same projections, that inflationary pressures will in-
crease over the current and the two following years. As in the case of growth, there will be 
a continuing duality between the emerging economies, where the risk of overheating is 
higher, and the advanced economies, for which price growth rates are anticipated that, in 
the absence of second-round effects associated with the rise in commodities costs, would 
be more contained, in a setting of rather lacklustre employment growth.
Significant risks surround this central scenario and, though they have tended to diminish, 
they continue to point to lower growth rates. Such risks include, primarily, those arising from 
the increase in oil prices, whose ultimate effects on inflation and activity will depend on how 
long the oil price holds at high levels and how it passes through to the prices of other goods 
and services, i.e. on the materialisation or not of the so-called indirect and second-round 
effects. Doubts about the soundness of public finances, the slowness of the return of real 
estate markets to a normal footing and high private-sector debt in some advanced econo-
mies might also check the recovery more than expected. The catastrophes in Japan, too, 
might have an impact on the world economy which, at present, is still difficult to assess. The 
pace and pattern of correction of the so-called “global imbalances” remain a source of un-
certainty. Finally, as regards the necessary resizing of the financial sector and the restructur-
ing of its regulatory frameworks, there has been progress. Yet the risks that may still arise 
from the behaviour of the international financial markets should not be underestimated. 
Turning to financial regulation, where the need for far-reaching change became evident 
with the crisis, the global work led by the G20 has continued, with the Financial Stabil-
ity Board playing a leading role. Mention should also be made of the recent Basel III 
Accord, which introduces new capital and liquidity requirements for banking systems. 
Together, they provide a common reference framework for the deep-seated reforms to 
national regulatory systems that are needed to correct the weaknesses revealed by the 
global crisis. The elements of this common framework include most notably enhanced 
transparency, closer monitoring of developments in the non-regulated financial system 
and tighter control of the systemic risks generated by financial institutions. This would 
be done by imposing greater countercyclical capital requirements, limits on the level of 
leverage and closer surveillance of remuneration arrangements so as to prevent these 
encouraging excessive risk-taking. Discussions also encompass other aspects such as 
taxes on financial activity or the establishment of appropriate mechanisms to manage 
and resolve potential bank crisis episodes. On the whole, this process has evidenced 
notable international coordination, which must be maintained in the future to ensure the 
success of the reforms. 
Notwithstanding, the international financial markets remain subject to considerable ten-
sions. And these are particularly visible in the euro area sovereign debt markets. Any fur-
ther episodes of instability here might translate into a tightening of financial conditions that 
would have unfavourable consequences for corporate and household spending decisions 
in the economies affected. To properly gauge the scale of this risk, the fundamental rea-
sons behind these tensions should be analysed in detail.
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Tensions in the euro area sovereign debt markets began to brew in late 2009 as a result of 
investors’ growing doubts about Greek public finances. The instability spread initially to 
the sovereign debt of those economies already perceived to be prone to greater vulnera-
bility. Such perceptions were based on their fiscal position (whether because of the high 
level of debt or deficit, or because of the pace at which either of these variables was dete-
riorating), the fragilities in their financial system and the presence of relatively weak foun-
dations for sustaining economic growth. But the problems also reached stock and foreign 
exchange markets and gave rise to a progressive loss of confidence by international inves-
tors which ultimately fed through to bank wholesale funding markets, causing serious li-
quidity problems to some institutions. As a result, the stability of the financial system of the 
area as a whole was affected, revealing the tight links between institutions and financial 
markets within the euro area. 
The reluctance of the Greek authorities to request financial support and the doubts 
expressed by European governments and authorities over the substance and form of 
any such support were a breeding ground for heightening tensions, which reached a 
critical point in May. That month saw the approval, finally, of a financial support pack-
age for Greece worth €110 billion, strictly conditional upon the Greek authorities 
adopting an ambitious economic adjustment programme. The funds were contributed 
by the euro area governments and by the International Monetary Fund. It befell the 
European Commission and the IMF, in collaboration with the ECB, to supervise com-
pliance with the terms of the agreement. To curb the growing contagion of the ten-
sions, the European Financial Stability Facility was instituted to run to 2013 and be 
capable of mobilising, along with the EC (through the European Financial Stability 
Mechanism) and the IMF, funds worth up to €750 billion to provide financial assistance 
in similar cases and under conditions that could also be equated to those of the Greek 
programme. 
These decisions contributed to easing tensions, as did too the publication in July of the 
results of the banking stress tests conducted under coordination across Europe, which 
offered a picture of banking system stability. However, over the summer and autumn a 
new source of tension arose, centred this time on the ongoing deterioration of the posi-
tion of Irish banks and on the consequences of the situation for Irish public finances. 
Once again, following an initial phase of some reluctance, the Irish authorities finally and 
formerly requested financial assistance. Their request was approved and took the form of 
a conditional programme, like that for Greece, worth €85 billion. In April 2011, Portugal 
joined the group of countries having to request financial assistance in light of its govern-
ment’s difficulty in carrying out the adjustment and reform plans needed and of the wors-
ening of financial market conditions. On 16 May Ecofin approved the related aid pro-
gramme. Weeks later, the continuing high sovereign spreads in Greece and the 
worse-than-expected behaviour of its main macroeconomic variables led to investor 
nervousness about Greece’s ability to return to the markets for funding in 2012, as envis-
aged in the financial assistance programme. Since the Greek authorities and govern-
ments of the rest of the euro area were unable to promptly define the strategy to pursue 
in light of this eventuality, tensions heightened, fuelled by untimely debates about how 
realistic certain traumatic scenarios were. 
In all three cases, the macroeconomic adjustment packages on which financial support 
was conditional envisaged ambitious fiscal consolidation programmes geared to restoring 
the soundness of public finances and thereby restoring investor confidence. In the rest of 
the area, the tensions experienced on the sovereign debt markets exerted the same effect. 
The sovereign debt crisis in 
Europe began in Greece and 
spread rapidly to the whole of 
the area
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Fiscal consolidation plans were brought forward and stepped up notably in Spain, with 
structural reforms being introduced at the same time. In Italy, Germany and other econo-
mies in the area, austerity programmes were likewise finalised with a view to their applica-
tion as from 2011. The sovereign debt crisis prompted not only a need to abandon the 
expansionary approach with which fiscal policy had responded in Europe to the initial 
wave of the international financial crisis, but also some urgency to reverse it. The tradi-
tional positive effects on growth of an expansionary fiscal policy (Keynesian effects) were 
exhausted and were rapidly replaced by others that operate to the detriment of activity. 
These are associated with the increases in long-term interest rates that occur when inves-
tors perceive a deterioration in the soundness of public finances and which ultimately 
prompt a fall-off in private spending (Ricardian effects). 
The euro area sovereign debt crisis is essentially the result of a series of imbalances and 
mismatches built up in the economies of certain Member States and their sudden emer-
gence and worsening as a result of the global economic and financial crisis. With differing 
degrees of influence in each case, these imbalances include most notably the continuous 
losses in the competitiveness of some economies; the excessive size of the financial sec-
tor and its excessive accumulation of risks, in other countries; and the high levels of pri-
vate debt prompted, in certain cases, by an expansionary single monetary policy stance 
insufficiently offset by the action of the other strands of economic policy in the hands of 
national authorities. Before the crisis, several Member States had high levels of public 
debt, accentuated on occasions by the existence of contingent public liabilities linked to 
the progressive ageing of the population or to the potential need to undertake banking 
system restructuring. The marked deterioration in budget deficits resulting from the opera-
tion of the automatic stabilisers and from the application of discretionary expansionary 
measures, the loss of extraordinary income linked to certain sectors such as the real estate 
and financial industries, and the influence of the support programs to financial institutions 
which it proved necessary to implement in some countries also contributed to undermin-
ing market confidence in the soundness of public finances. A further factor weakening 
confidence lay in growth prospects, weighed down by relatively unfavourable productivity 
and potential growth developments. As is known, the financial markets have a tendency to 
overreact to news, whereby it is likely that, in this episode too, investors’ response may 
have been excessive in some cases. But that should not mask the real scope of the prob-
lems that have emerged. 
The build-up of these imbalances without any mechanism in place to warn about their poten-
tial risks and their possible effects on the area also reveals the existence of weaknesses in the 
euro area’s non-monetary economic policy coordination and surveillance mechanisms, which 
have acted as amplifiers of the tensions. The sovereign debt crisis has highlighted not only 
the limitations of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) and of national fiscal frameworks in 
promoting a sufficient degree of fiscal discipline, but also the inadequate attention to the ac-
cumulation of macroeconomic imbalances that are not necessarily fiscal in nature, as men-
tioned in the previous paragraph. Further, the scale of the tensions, their contagiousness and 
their interrelatedness with the thrust of the discussions on how to address economic govern-
ance in the area are by no means unrelated to the absence of powerful formal mechanisms to 
resolve situations such as those experienced by Greece, Ireland and Portugal, and to the 
difficulties involved in setting such mechanisms in place amid a crisis. 
The tensions on financial markets and, in particular, those created by the increase in sover-
eign risk, affected the monetary policy transmission mechanism and obliged the ECB to take 
measures supplementing those it had already adopted in response to the crisis. More spe-
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cifically, the absence of medium-term inflationary pressures meant that the ECB Governing 
Council was able in 2010 to retain its expansionary monetary policy stance in the euro area, 
holding official interest rates unchanged at the minimum level of 1 %. However, to ensure the 
effective transmission of its decisions, the Eurosystem continued to apply credit support 
measures, concentrated mainly in the ample provision of liquidity. In addition, the strong ten-
sions on some public debt markets led to the Securities Market Programme being imple-
mented. During the year, nonetheless, the covered bonds purchase programme expired, and 
repayment fell due of the special longer-term loan operations that had been introduced at 
the critical points of the international financial crisis. Accordingly, a sizeable portion of the 
excess liquidity was reabsorbed without giving rise to tensions on interbank markets, which 
shows how the progressive normalisation of these markets continued apace last year. 
In the immediate future, euro area monetary policy will be at a complex juncture that 
poses significant challenges. The gradual withdrawal of the exceptional measures in place 
should be carefully calibrated to avoid interfering in the normalisation of financial markets 
while preventing, too, the maintenance of the measures for too long from reducing the ef-
fectiveness of monetary policy, detracting from the ECB’s credibility, distorting the relative 
prices of assets and delaying the reforms needed in certain segments of the European 
banking sector. At the same time, the rise in commodities prices and the difficulties of as-
sessing their medium-term trajectory are a further complication. This may hamper the 
adjustment of the monetary policy stance to a scenario in which the consequent risks of 
indirect and second-round effects that might endanger continuing price stability combine 
with a slow rate of recovery and, therefore, the slow closure of the output gap, and with a 
still-uncertain situation on financial markets. Against this background, the ECB Governing 
Council decided at its April 2011 meeting to raise official rates by 25 bp. 
The challenges for the other European institutions are likewise significant. First, they 
must successfully overhaul the euro area’s economic policy coordination and surveil-
lance mechanisms. As explained in greater detail in Chapter 4 of this Report, the reform 
targets greater and more effective coordination of national policies, which should move 
within agreed limits and which will be subject to mutual, rigorous and effective surveil-
lance. The recommendations of the so-called “Van Rompuy Working Group” were, along 
with the attendant EC proposals, the first steps of a process that should conclude this 
summer. The measures being considered may be classified under three major headings: 
those aimed at ensuring greater fiscal discipline, through the strengthening of the SGP; 
those geared to introducing a new mechanism for monitoring macroeconomic imbal-
ances and competitiveness; and the design of a permanent crisis-management mecha-
nism. Under no circumstances are changes that might require an amendment of funda-
mental aspects of the EU Treaty envisaged, thereby avoiding the risk of an unwanted 
stretching out of the reform.
As part of the reform programme, the EC published in early 2011 the first Annual Growth 
Report, thus inaugurating the “European Semester” of economic policy coordination. For 
the first time, the Member States and the Commission will jointly analyse the risks to mac-
roeconomic stability, headway in fiscal consolidation, and the structural reforms and other 
necessary measures for promoting growth. The European Council’s recommendations 
should be taken into account in preparing the national budgets for 2012 and in the imple-
mentation of other national economic policies. Along the same lines, the new “Europe 
2020” strategy, aimed at increasing European growth potential, has entailed introduction 
of a series of emblematic initiatives at the European level, geared to supporting member 
countries’ reform drives. 
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The success of these reforms and their degree of ambition will determine whether the new 
governance framework is indeed able to withstand the challenges facing the EU. The 
sovereign debt crisis has highlighted the need to strengthen the European institutional 
framework and, particularly in the case of the euro area, to attune it to the high degree of 
integration and economic interdependence attained among its members. A sufficient de-
gree of automaticity and reasonably restrained implementation schedules both for proce-
dures and, where appropriate, for sanctions, will help ensure that the sound working of 
the mechanisms does not depend on national governments’ willingness to meet the com-
mitments entered into.
In this respect, the European Summit on 24-25 March 2011 gave fresh impetus to the 
legislative reform process that will underpin the new framework for the prevention and cor-
rection of fiscal (i.e. a strengthened SGP) and non-fiscal (the creation of the excessive 
imbalance procedure) imbalances. The Summit also laid down the core principles for a 
new, permanent crisis management and resolution mechanism that will come into force 
from 2013 (the European Stability Mechanism), and it approved the “Euro Plus Pact”, 
which enshrines the Member States’ political commitment to adopt measures aimed at 
improving competitiveness, increasing employment, ensuring the sustainability of public 
finances and reinforcing financial stability in the area. However, more immediately ahead, 
the situation in Ireland, Portugal and, especially, Greece poses a challenge whose scale 
should not be underestimated. The transition to this new, reinforced European governance 
framework is taking place amid the harshest crisis the euro has faced since its creation. If 
this complex situation is not tackled with the resolve required to overcome it conclusively, 
the common European project might undergo a setback whose consequences are difficult 
to foresee and which would jeopardise the success of the efforts made to date. 
Another of the structural shortcomings highlighted by the crisis is the absence of macro-
prudential and eminently pre-emptive economic policies aimed at ensuring the stability of 
the financial system as a whole and at minimising the effects of instability on the real 
economy. A consensus has been built around the need to develop a set of early-warning 
instruments to detect the potential build-up of macroeconomic and financial imbalances 
capable of leading to large-scale financial crises. The development of macroprudential 
policy is being addressed through a number of national and international initiatives. These 
include most notably, within the EU, the institution of the European Systemic Risk Board 
(ESRB) which, along with the three new European supervisory authorities with a micropru-
dential remit for the banking, securities and insurance sectors, comprise the new Euro-
pean supervisory architecture (the European Financial Supervision System). 
The success of the action undertaken at the European level will hinge crucially on whether 
it is complemented by the measures adopted at the level of the Member States. As re-
gards public finances, the euro area governments have formally undertaken to adopt all 
the measures needed to meet the fiscal targets envisaged under the excessive deficit 
procedures. Some countries have adopted additional commitments to speed through the 
fiscal consolidation foreseen under these procedures and to provide greater guarantees as 
to the sustainability of their public finances. Such progress towards laying the foundations 
for a prudent fiscal policy that ultimately provides for the return to a path of balanced and 
sustainable growth is crucial at the current juncture. 
Now the limits of expansionary demand policies have been reached, structural reforms 
aimed at increasing the responsiveness of economies to shocks, at making them more 
flexible and at raising, in the medium term, growth potential and the capacity to achieve 
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full employment of productive resources should be the chief priority of economic policy 
action. Along these lines, the Europe 2020 strategy offers a coherent framework to Mem-
ber States for implementing a co-ordinated and comprehensive programme of structural 
reforms, which are vital to boost European growth. Finally, it is important that the ongoing 
restructuring, resizing and recapitalisation of the crisis-hit European banking systems 
should be satisfactorily concluded. Along with the above-mentioned global regulatory re-
forms, these should serve to entrench a sound financial system capable of contributing 
effectively to economic growth through the efficient intermediation of financial flows.
The financial tensions that rocked European markets from May forcefully impacted the 
Spanish economy. The main channel of transmission was the diminished confidence of the 
markets, which was quite acute at certain points in the year, coinciding with the bouts of 
maximum tension in Greece and Ireland. In an economy like Spain’s that is strongly de-
pendent on external saving, these episodes translated into a tightening of lending stand-
ards, markedly so for the Treasury and credit institutions. Spain’s sovereign debt spread 
against the German benchmark was subjected to various bouts of pressure which saw it 
widen to close to 300 bp at the most critical points. Difficulties spread also to the banking 
sector, which for many months found access to the wholesale markets substantially 
blocked. And this, temporarily, significantly increased Spanish banks’ recourse to the 
Eurosystem. 
As in the case of the other euro area countries, the tensions involved an element of over-
reaction by investors. But it would be mistaken to dismiss the importance of the prob-
lems underlying these tensions. The aforementioned weaknesses of the European insti-
tutional framework and the doubts generated about the commitment of European 
governments in general, and of Spain in particular, to tackle structural problems and 
deteriorating public finances also played a key role in the initial stages of this latest 
round of financial instability. 
The vulnerabilities that had emerged further to the crisis seriously increased the Spanish 
economy’s exposure to this type of turbulence, at a particularly delicate juncture. The cri-
sis had given rise to a rapid deterioration in public finances, manifest not only in a very high 
budget deficit level, up to 11.1 % of GDP in 2009 from a surplus of 1.9 % two years earlier, 
but also in the swift rise in the public debt ratio, despite the fact that general government 
debt remained far lower than that of other European economies facing similar pressures. 
Moreover, the surge in the unemployment rate, as a consequence of the depth of the re-
cession in Spain but also of labour market dysfunctionalities, raised doubts about the 
possibility of reversing the course of public spending in the absence of reforms conducive 
to reducing unemployment and boosting growth. 
During the upturn prior to the crisis, Spain had become very dependent on external financ-
ing, a situation that persisted – albeit to a lesser extent in 2010 – and which increased the 
economy’s vulnerability to episodes involving a loss of confidence. These episodes ham-
pered access to the external financing that had been routed through credit institutions, 
whose role was seriously diminished by the doubts over specific segments of the banking 
industry, related to the scope of the impact of real estate asset impairment on the sound-
ness of their financial position. Lastly, high household and corporate debt and the cumula-
tive losses in competitiveness, the result of spending excesses during the upturn, were 
perceived by investors as a check on the recovery of expenditure, whereby the uncer-
tainty spread also to the economy’s growth capacity, once the real estate excesses had 
been corrected.
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As the fiscal crisis unfolded, some of these vulnerabilities elicited parallels – in many cases 
unfounded – with the experiences of the Greek and Irish economies, which had to resort to 
external financial support conditional upon harsh adjustment programmes overseen by the 
IMF and the European institutions. The labelling of certain countries on the basis solely of the 
nature of their difficulties, as opposed to the actual scale and potential scope of such difficul-
ties, has been a further factor amplifying the market tensions that have affected the Spanish 
economy. These financial strains hampered the ongoing adjustment and resizing of the finan-
cial system, eroded the confidence of households and firms, which had embarked on a 
process of slow deleveraging, and further checked the pick-up in private spending. 
Economic policy reacted with an abrupt shift in stance in the required direction, which had 
a key bearing on the course of spending and on macroeconomic developments in Spain 
during the period analysed in this report. Given the source of the tensions, it was vital to 
dispel doubts over the trajectory of public finances through a demanding fiscal adjustment 
plan that would ensure compliance with the goals of the Stability Programme for the 2010-
2013 period. In parallel, there was clearly a compelling need to tackle the labour market 
shortcomings that were hampering the absorption of unemployment and the adjustment 
to the economy, through the reform of some of the institutional determinants of the labour 
market. Lastly, in the financial arena, bank restructuring was speeded up, a far-reaching 
reform of the regulation of savings banks was set in train (providing, inter alia, for the trans-
fer of their financial activity to newly created institutions structured in the form of banks 
and encouraging the entry of private capital into the sector), unprecedented transparency 
measures were taken and capital requirements were increased so as to dispel doubts 
about their solvency, even in scenarios of exceptional tension. All these measures are ana-
lysed in greater detail at a later stage, when economic policy challenges are addressed.
In 2010 the Spanish economy slowly embarked on a course of recovery, posting positive 
GDP growth rates throughout the year, except in Q3. At the same time, progress was made 
on the adjustment of the imbalances that had built up during the upturn. The correction of 
the excess in real estate investment, the reduction in net borrowing abroad and the defla-
tionary path in labour costs and final prices all continued, and were joined by the start of a 
reduction in the budget deficit. The outstanding balance of private-sector credit stabilised, 
although the sector’s debt held at a high level which continued to influence spending deci-
sions. During the opening months of 2011 the pattern of sluggish recovery continued, and 
GDP posted a growth rate of 0.3 % in Q1, placing the related year-on-year rate at 0.8 %.
The recovery in 2010 began with some delay and less intensity than that of the euro area 
countries as a result of the greater scale of the crisis in Spain and of the impact that the 
necessary process of adjustment is exerting on short-term growth rates. The recovery in 
output was subject, however, to oscillations during the year as a result of certain tempo-
rary measures acting on the path of domestic spending. Specifically, the rise in VAT sched-
uled for 1 July and the foreseeable end of some of the expenditure-promoting public aid 
programmes (such as the State Fund for Local Investment and the car scrappage scheme) 
led some spending decisions to be brought forward to the first half of the year, while the 
effects of the austerity measures approved in May, chiefly affecting the public components 
of national demand, were felt in the second half of the year. 
Despite the gradually improving path referred to, GDP fell by 0.1 % for the year on average, 
the results of the carryover effect of the declines in output the previous year (3.7 %; see 
Table 1.1). Overall, domestic demand remained sluggish, influenced by the withdrawal of 
the public-sector expansionary impulse to aggregate demand, although the impact on 
4  The adjustment and 
re-balancing of the 
Spanish economy, and 
the turnaround in 
economic policy 
The sovereign debt crisis 
prompted an abrupt 
turnaround in the economic 
policy stance 
The Spanish economy began 
a slow recovery in 2010
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2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
DEMAND AND OUTPUT (b)
GDP 3.6 4.0 3.6 0.9 -3.7 -0.1
Private consumption 4.2 3.8 3.7 -0.6 -4.2 1.2
Government consumption 5.5 4.6 5.5 5.8 3.2 -0.7
Gross capital formation 6.5 8.3 4.2 -4.3 -15.8 -7.0
Equipment investment 9.2 9.9 10.4 -2.5 -24.8 1.8
Construction investment 6.1 6.0 3.2 -5.9 -11.9 -11.1
Housing 6.1 6.2 2.5 -10.7 -24.5 -16.8
Other construction 6.2 5.8 4.0 -0.8 -0.1 -7.2
Exports of goods and services 2.5 6.7 6.7 -1.1 -11.6 10.3
Imports of goods and services 7.7 10.2 8.0 -5.3 -17.8 5.4
EMPLOYMENT, WAGES, COST AND PRICES (c)
Total employment 3.2 3.3 2.8 -0.5 -6.6 -2.4
Employment rate (d) 64.3 65.7 66.6 65.3 60.6 59.4
Unemployment rate 9.2 8.5 8.3 11.3 18.0 20.1
Compensation per employee 3.7 4.0 4.8 6.4 4.1 0.7
Unit labour costs 3.3 3.3 4.0 4.9 1.0 -1.5
GDP dekator 4.3 4.1 3.3 2.4 0.6 1.0
Consumer price index (12-month % change) 3.7 2.7 4.2 1.4 0.8 3.0
Consumer price index (annual average) 3.4 3.5 2.8 4.1 -0.3 1.8
Consumer price differential with the euro area (HICP) 1.2 1.4 0.7 0.9 -0.5 0.4
SAVING, INVESTMENT AND FINANCIAL BALANCE (e)
Resident sectors: saving (f) 22.9 22.6 21.5 19.9 19.3 19.1
General government (f) 4.5 5.7 6.0 -0.1 -6.6 -5.4
Resident sectors: investment 29.5 31.0 31.0 29.1 24.5 23.0
General government 3.6 3.6 4.1 4.0 4.5 3.8
Resident sectors: domestic net lending (+) or net borrowing (–) -6.5 -8.4 -9.6 -9.2 -5.1 -3.9
General government 1.0 2.0 1.9 -4.2 -11.1 -9.2
General government gross debt 43.0 39.6 36.1 39.8 53.3 60.1
MONETARY AND FINANCIAL INIDICATORS (i)
ECB minimum bid rate on MROs 2.0 2.8 3.9 3.9 1.2 1.0
Ten-year government bond yield 3.4 3.8 4.3 4.4 4.0 4.2
Synthetic bank lending rate 3.8 4.6 5.7 6.2 3.8 3.3
Madrid Stock Exchange General Index (DEC 1985 = 100) 1,060.2 1,324.0 1,631.8 1,278.3 1,042.4 1,076.5
Dollar/euro exchange rate 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.4 1.3
Nominal effective exchange rate vis-à-vis developed countries (h) 100.5 100.7 101.7 103.3 103.5 101.9
Real effective exchange rate vis-à-vis developed countries (i) 108.8 111.6 115.4 119.2 116.1 113.0
Real effective exchange rate vis-à-vis the euro area (i) 107.4 110.1 113.0 114.7 111.0 109.6
Cash and cash equivalents 14.4 11.3 -3.1 -3.3 8.6 -0.2
Liquid assets (l) 11.6 8.4 8.3 9.8 1.0 3.0
Households: total jnancing 20.9 19.6 12.5 4.4 -0.3 0.2
Non-jnancial corporations: total jnancing 21.4 27.9 17.7 7.9 -1.5 1.0
MAIN INDICATORS OF THE SPANISH ECONOMY (a)  TABLE 1.1
SOURCES: INE, IGAE, AMECO and Banco de España.
a The National Accounts data are calculated on the basis of base year 2000.
b Volume indices. Rate of change.
c Rate of change, except the unemployment rate, which is a level.
d Employment rate (16-64). 
e Levels as a percentage of GDP.  
f Includes net capital transfers received.
g Annual average levels for interest rates and exchange rates and rate of change for jnancial assets and liabilities. 
h 1999 Q1 = 100.
i 1999 Q1 = 100. Measured with unit labour costs.
j Includes cash equivalents, other bank liabilities and money-market funds.
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activity was softened by the positive contribution of net external demand, an effect in 
which the thrust of exports was predominant. 
Household spending showed its first signs of growth following two years of strong de-
clines, although these were centred exclusively on the consumption component, since 
residential investment fell off once again. The pick-up in consumption was uneven over the 
course of the year since the rise in indirect taxation from July and the end of the car scrap-
page schemes prompted households to bring forward their spending decisions to the first 
half of the year, which lessened the volume of purchases in the final six months.
The recovery came about in a setting in which high debt continued to significantly restrain 
any greater buoyancy in spending and in which disposable income fell as a result of the 
decline in wage income and the lesser contribution of other sources of income that had 
underpinned it in the recession. There was a fall in the general government contribution 
which, although it remained expansionary in step with the situation of cyclical weakness 
still prevailing, accounted for a lesser amount owing to the withdrawal of the stimuli ap-
plied in prior years. Wealth also fell, albeit less sharply than in 2009, in both its financial 
and real estate components. Against this backdrop, the saving ratio fell sharply in 2010, 
breaking the upward course on which it had moved for three years, standing at 13.1 % of 
disposable income for the year on average. Set against the lacklustre spending described, 
the resort to borrowed funds was flat, although the low rates of credit received were ulti-
mately insufficient to significantly reduce the sector’s debt ratios (see Chart 1.2). 
Household spending began to 
rise, driven by the increase in 
consumption …
… despite the contraction in 
disposable income and the 
need to reduce debt
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Residential investment continued to contract, bringing its cumulative fall since the start of 
the downturn to almost 50 %, which placed the weight of residential investment at 4.7 % 
of GDP (4.5 pp down on the peak three years earlier), in line with the historical average. 
These figures suggest that the bulk of the correction of the real estate overhang in terms 
of activity has already been made. During the year, some housing demand indicators be-
gan to rise owing to the bringing forward of property purchases in the face of the tax 
changes that were introduced (the rise in VAT in July and the partial elimination of tax de-
ductions effective 2011), but also to the improvement in affordability. This meant that, on 
available estimates that are not free from uncertainty, the stock of unsold housing ceased 
to increase in 2010, marking the start of a period of absorption of excess stocks which 
may be prolonged. House prices declined once again in 2010, and this trend continued 
into the opening months of 2011, placing the fall from the peak at 15.4 % (19.3 % in real 
terms). The scale of this decline is still less than that observed in the real estate slump in 
the 1970s, whereby further declines in house prices should not be ruled out. 
Investment by non-financial corporations during 2010 was uneven by component in a set-
ting of tight lending conditions, excess accumulated capacity and limited headway in on-
going corporate deleveraging. Investment in capital goods picked up slightly following the 
collapse the previous year, influenced by the need to replace plant, the improvement in 
export markets and the impact of the plan to stimulate commercial vehicle purchases. By 
contrast, the component of investment in non-residential construction performed more 
negatively, as it was affected by the infrastructure investment cuts in the second half of the 
year.
Over the course of 2010 the improvement in the net lending capacity of non-financial cor-
porations continued. The increase in saving, far outweighing that in investment, meant that 
net lending was equivalent to 0.4 % of GDP for the year on average, an exceptional situa-
tion judging by its historical trajectory. This increase in corporate saving was largely based 
on ongoing staff cuts which allowed for a reduction in unit wage costs, although the sig-
nificant cut in the interest burden as the lagged result of lower interest rates also contrib-
uted. In the case of households, the fall-off in saving, which was sharper than that in in-
vestment, led to net lending that was lower than the previous year but positive for the third 
year running, for an amount equivalent to 4 % of GDP. 
The behaviour of the private sector, along with the cut in the budget deficit, which stood at 
9.2 % of GDP, prompted a fresh reduction in the nation’s net borrowing to 3.9 % of GDP 
(see Chart 1.3). This marks a considerable improvement from the levels of maximum ex-
ternal dependence attained in 2007 (close to 10 % of GDP), although behind this are cer-
tain risk factors that should be mentioned. From the standpoint of trade with the rest of the 
world, the headroom for improvement in the trade balance seems somewhat exhausted 
owing to the adverse impact exerted by the energy bill, amplified in recent months by the 
hike in oil prices, and a marked decline in the deficit arising on investment income pay-
ments. Indeed, the pattern seen in 2010 is illustrative of the challenges that must be ad-
dressed in order to further reduce reliance on external saving in the future. A priority will be 
that exports should be able to continue benefiting from the pick-up in world trade with 
further adjustments in competitiveness and with the design of ambitious diversification 
strategies for our markets. It is likewise vital that import dependence be reduced, most 
particularly in relation to the energy component. It should be borne in mind that the pos-
sibility of reducing the income balance deficit, which was cut significantly in 2010, is re-
stricted by the economy’s high net debit position vis-à-vis the rest of the world and the 
current low level of interest rates. 
The contractionary path of 
residential investment, by 
contrast, continued...
... whereas the course of the 
different components of 
business investment was 
uneven
The net lending capacity of 
the non-financial corporations 
sector continued to improve…
…as did the nation’s net 
borrowing, which once again 
declined
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The economy’s capacity to generate jobs was once again weighed down by the ongoing slide in 
construction activity. This was influenced in 2010 by the fact that civil engineering works ground 
to a halt, following the cut in public investment under the fiscal austerity plan (see Chart 1.4). 
Uncertainty over the strength of the recovery, doubts over the scale of the reforms under way 
and the sluggishness of domestic expenditure further weighed on hiring decisions both in indus-
try and in market services, which continued destroying employment, albeit to a lesser degree. 
The prolonged deterioration in the labour market altered the dynamics of labour supply, which 
expanded very moderately (0.2 %), far off the average rate of close to 3 % for the years 2005-
2008. Behind this weak increase lies the loss of momentum of the working-age population 
seen since the previous year, and influenced by the sharp decline in net immigration flows (in 
the two years spanning 2009 and 2010, these flows were somewhat less than 10 % of the aver-
age for the period 2005-2008). This prompted a decline in the foreign working-age population, 
for the first time since 1990, and a 0.7 % decline in the foreign labour force. Notwithstanding, 
the participation rate rose slightly owing to the increase in female participation, since the at-
tendant male rate and that of the younger cohorts reacted adversely to the cyclical situation. 
Despite the check on the increase in the labour force, unemployment continued to rise in 
2010, albeit at a more moderate rate than in previous years, and the unemployment rate 
climbed to 21.3 % in 2011 Q1. Unemployment affected youths, the less-skilled and for-
eigners more severely. Long-term unemployment rose sharply, accounting for 42.5 % of 
Job destruction continued for 
another year, eroding 
confidence and the capacity 
for recovery
Labour supply expanded 
moderately, influenced by the 
fall-off in the working-age 
population…
… but unemployment 
continued to rise, particularly 
sharply in the long-term 
component
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the total for the year on average (46.6 % in Q1 this year). These figures are sufficiently il-
lustrative of the scale of the challenge that bringing back an increasingly larger group into 
the labour market poses, and it presages a substantial increase in the structural compo-
nent of unemployment, which demands an energetic economic policy response. 
Against the background of labour market weakness, labour costs eased substantially dur-
ing 2010. They did so more sharply in the second half of the year, owing to the direct and 
indirect influence of the cut in public-sector wages (see Chart 1.5). Compensation per 
employee increased by 0.7 %, in strong contrast to the 4 % increase recorded in labour 
costs in 2009. A significant portion of the slowdown was due to the change in trajectory of 
public-sector wages, which declined by 1.8 % (after having increased by 4 % in 2009 and 
by 7 % over the 2007-2008 period). The remainder was due to the slowdown in compensa-
tion per employee in the market economy, which increased at a rate of 1.4 % (compared 
with the rises of 3.7 % in 2009 and of 5.9 % in 2008, when the sharpest phase of the reces-
sion began). Behind this result lay the smaller increase in wage settlements, influenced by 
the recommendations of the Pact for Employment and Collective Bargaining entered into 
by the social partners in February 2010, and the absence of inflationary pressures, which 
in turn provided for a fall in market-economy unit labour costs, for the second year run-
ning. Collectively bargained wage settlements in the opening months of 2011 have evi-
denced a rise which, if it takes root, would jeopardise the improvements in competitive-
ness needed to reactivate output and employment.
CPI inflation rose in the second half of the year, posting a year-on-year growth rate of 3 % 
in December 2010 (see Chart 1.6). It has continued on this trajectory to date in 2011, plac-
ing the year-on-year rate of change of consumer prices at 3.8 % in April, having been 
strongly affected by the sharp growth in oil prices in recent months. Much of this increase 
is due to essentially temporary factors, such as tax changes and regulated prices, and the 
upward course of commodities prices. They all have a direct and significant effect on price 
levels and on the inflation rate but, if there are no indirect effects on business costs, their 
impact will ultimately be stripped out of the year-on-year CPI rate after a year. To ensure 
the rise in inflation is temporary, it is thus vital that these indirect effects should be limited 
and that there should be no generalised revision of inflation expectations that ultimately 
affects final prices in a permanent way, either through the prices producers set or through 
wage bargaining. Any reluctance to accept the temporary losses in real income that the 
rise in energy prices and in indirect taxation entails for workers and companies would 
translate into more persistent inflationary pressures and into diminished possibilities of 
recovery and job creation. 
The outlook for 2011 is one of slow recovery and will involve great dependence on the 
ability to harness the momentum of the rest of the world through substantial improvements 
in competitiveness, allowing external demands to provide the support needed for the take-
off in activity and employment. The pick-up in domestic demand is conditional upon the 
level of private-sector debt. This scenario is subject to great uncertainty and potential 
downside risks, associated with the tensions on financial markets that might continue to 
adversely affect financing conditions and economic agents’ confidence. An added risk is 
that arising from the hike in oil prices, which may alter the course of recovery in the ad-
vanced countries and affect economic and financial agents’ confidence. This shock may 
exacerbate the supply-side factors that have traditionally constrained flexibility and the 
potential for growth in the economy, and which stem from the interplay of high energy 
dependence with rigidity in cost and price formation in Spain. An easing in inflation and the 
adjustment of relative prices are essential prerequisites of recovery (see Box 1.1). 
In the setting of labour market 
weakness, labour costs eased 
significantly
And inflation rose forcefully 
owing to predominantly 
temporary factors
The outlook for 2011 is one of 
slow recovery that is not 
exempt from considerable 
uncertainty
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As highlighted in the previous sections, the tensions experienced by the Spanish economy 
were largely due to the vulnerabilities that emerged further to the financial crisis, vulnera-
bilities rooted in the macroeconomic imbalances that had built up during the long upturn. 
One year into this new phase of the crisis, linked to sovereign debt, the factors blocking a 
return to a path of sustained growth have not been fully eliminated and nor have the 
doubts over the economy’s medium and long-term growth capacity, despite the shift in the 
economic policy stance. That all makes for a difficult situation that poses significant chal-
lenges, which include bolstering the recovery while completing the adjustments under 
way, restructuring the economy and restoring confidence. 
In these circumstances, the economic policy response is pivotal and the role of the struc-
tural reforms central to seeing through the correction of the imbalances. The future trajec-
tory of the Spanish economy will hinge on how demanding the response proves; and most 
particularly, on the speed and scale of the recovery and its capacity to generate employ-
ment. In the past, the pursuit at critical moments of ambitious reforms was key to promot-
ing ongoing modernisation and real convergence. Within the euro area, the design and 
implementation of structural reforms is even more important because there is no exchange 
rate available to generate short-term gains in competitiveness and because the leeway for 
using expansionary demand-side policies has been exhausted. At the current juncture, 
there is a timely possibility that the adjustment effort may enable the full adaptation of the 
economy to the macroeconomic stability requirements that euro area membership entails. 
5  The scale of the 
challenges and the 
responsibility of 
economic policy 
The Spanish economy faces a 
difficult situation, and 
overcoming it will require 
ambitious economic policies
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BOX 1.1THE ROLE OF PRICE AND WAGE FLEXIBILITY IN THE ADJUSTMENT OF THE SPANISH ECONOMY WITHIN
THE EURO AREA 
An economy’s capacity for adjustment in the face of different 
shocks depends on a series of structural and institutional charac-
teristics, including most notably the adaptability of prices and 
wages to changes in their fundamentals. In the case of the Span-
ish economy, wage- and price-setting mechanisms have given rise 
to a pattern of adjustment that leads to significant fluctuations in 
employment and activity, with prices and wages showing more 
inertia, as demonstrated by various recent papers.1 In the latest 
crisis, for instance, the scale of job destruction was far greater 
than that in other euro area countries where the fall in GDP was of 
a similar magnitude; subsequently, the difficulties faced by the 
Spanish economy in generating net employment mean that emerg-
ing from the crisis is proving more belated and less intense. There-
fore, it is worth questioning to what extent the presence of price 
and wage rigidities has been a relevant factor in the recession and 
may hold back the current phase of recovery. 
To illustrate the scope of these questions, use is made below of a 
general equilibrium model (called BEMOD) estimated for the Span-
ish economy within the Economic and Monetary Union. It reflects 
the various degrees of nominal and real rigidity existing in Spain 
and the rest of the euro area, in the form of different values esti-
mated for wage indexation or for the frequency of revision of pric-
es and wages in the face of changes in their determinants, such as 
marginal cost and the reserve wage, respectively.2 It should be 
borne in mind that BEMOD explicitly models no financial aspects 
other than interest rate movements and, therefore, these results, 
like all those obtained from highly stylised models, should be 
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SOURCE: Banco de España.
a The sum of the contributions of all the shocks envisaged is not equal to the actual growth rate of GDP or of wages, but to the deviation of this rate from its average 
in the period 1997-2009.
1  For the case of wages, see, for example, P. Cuadrado, P. Hernández de 
Cos and M. Izquierdo (2011), “Wage adjustments to shocks in Spain”, 
Economic Bulletin, April, Banco de España. For price rigidities, a quan-
tification for Spain and other European countries can be found in Dhyne 
et al. (2006), “Price Changes in the Euro Area and the United States: 
Some Facts from Individual Consumer Price Data”, Journal of Economic 
Perspectives. 
2  See the article by Andrés, Hurtado, Ortega and Thomas (2010), “Spain 
in the Euro: a General Equilibrium Analysis”, published in SERIEs, vol. 1.
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BOX 1.1THE ROLE OF PRICE AND WAGE FLEXIBILITY IN THE ADJUSTMENT OF THE SPANISH ECONOMY WITHIN
THE EURO AREA (cont’d)
viewed with due caution.3 In line with recent papers, the model 
estimates an average duration of prices of less than one year both 
in Spain and in the rest of the euro area, and of slightly more than 
one year in wages, as well as a moderate effect of past inflation on 
prices, which is more significant in the non-tradable sectors than 
in those exposed to international competition, and similar in both 
economies. However, the estimated degree of wage indexation is 
high in Spain and scarcely significant on average in the other Eu-
ropean economies. 
The model enables the various factors behind the fall in activity 
in Spain and the euro area during the latest crisis to be identified. 
The top panels in the accompanying chart depict GDP growth in 
Spain and in the rest of the euro area along with the contributions 
of the main shocks that made these economies deviate from 
their historical average growth pattern.4 Of note at the start of the 
recession is the sizeable negative contribution of the “rest of the 
world” item, which captures, above all, the effect of the strong 
fall-off in world demand and which exerts a greater influence on 
the rest of the euro area than on Spain, which is less open to the 
rest of the world. It was also the pick-up in external demand that 
made a firmer contribution to the economic recovery in 2010 – 
once again to a greater extent in the rest of the euro area – along 
with the continuing expansionary stance of monetary policy, with 
lower interest rates than would be denoted by the estimated re-
sponse in the model of these rates to inflation and growth (the 
estimated Taylor rule suggests that, for the observed decline in 
GDP and inflation, the reduction in interest rates might have been 
sharper and swifter). The red bars show a broad set of shocks, 
mainly those related to public demand (which had a very marked 
positive effect during the public stimulus programmes of 2008 
and 2009, and a negative impact with the consolidation meas-
ures introduced in 2010) and national private demand (which 
posted very negative contributions in 2008 and 2009), but also 
those connected to productivity, and those from the rest of the 
euro area.5
Along with these contributions of various shocks to the crisis, a 
clearly negative effect on growth was identified in 2009-2010 
owing to the insufficient adjustment of prices and wages to the 
changes in their determinants, even in relation to the above-
mentioned gradual response estimated by the model, through a 
non-immediate resetting of prices and wages and of indexation 
to past price inflation, which was virtually non-existent in wages 
in the rest of the euro area, but close to 50 % in the case of 
wages in Spain. The contributions of the various shocks to 
wage developments represented in the lower panels of the ac-
companying chart show that wages grew in Spain above their 
determinants (the positive shocks are depicted by green bars) 
from 2008. In the absence of that rigidity, for example, wages 
would have declined by 1.4 % in 2009, compared with the 4 % 
growth observed. Given the delayed effect of wages on employ-
ment and activity, that would have prompted a positive impulse 
of 2.6 pp to GDP in 2010. In the rest of the euro area, although 
wages have outgrown their determinants since 2009, they have 
done so to a lesser extent than in Spain and their impact on 
activity is small. 
With a view to the recovery phase ahead for the Spanish economy, 
it is therefore necessary to insist on the advisability of pursuing the 
required reforms so as to have a greater degree of price and, 
especially, wage flexibility. In the context of the euro area, the 
3  Interest rates are modelled following an estimated Taylor rule where the 
short-term rates on which the ECB acts change in response to move-
ments in inflation and activity in the euro area as a whole. That said, they 
may undergo shocks that make them take values above or below these 
fundamentals.
4  That is to say, the sum of the contributions of all the shocks envisaged 
is not equal to the GDP or wage growth rate, but to the deviation of this 
rate from its average value in the model’s estimation period (1997-2008). 
%
Estimated rigidities
Flexible
economy
Estimated rigidities
Flexible
economy
GDP -1.59 -1.14 -1.11 -0.93
Employment -1.12 -0.62 -0.78 -0.57
Consumption dekator 1.74 1.34 1.18 1.01
Nominal wages 0.04 -0.82 -0.21 -0.76
Accumulated level differences in the second year compared with the baseline scenario
Spain Rest of the euro area
SIMULATION OF A 50% RISE IN OIL PRICES (a)  
SOURCE: Banco de España. 
5  Some of these contributions are very significant individually, but on be-
ing grouped together they tend to cancel one another out, hence the 
relatively small size of the contribution of this set of shocks. 
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impossibility of devaluing our currency should be made up for by 
a degree of price and wage flexibility that provides for the possibil-
ity of gains in price-competitiveness. Such flexibility is, moreover, 
vital in a setting in which further shocks will come about, such as 
the recent rise in oil prices. 
To illustrate how a reduction in these rigidities might help the 
recovery in the Spanish economy over the coming years, the 
accompanying table simulates with BEMOD the effects of a rise 
in oil prices under different scenarios. When the model is used 
with the degree of rigidity estimated with observed data, it can 
be seen that, given a persistent increase in oil prices of 50 %, 
GDP in Spain would decline by 1.6 pp relative to the baseline 
scenario after two years, and employment by 1.1 pp, also rela-
tive to the baseline scenario. In the rest of the euro area, how-
ever, the deviations in activity and employment would be only 
1.1 pp and 0.8 pp, respectively, due to both their greater ob-
served flexibility and to the lesser weight of energy in their pro-
ductive processes and in their consumption basket. A simula-
tion has also been performed of what would happen in a sce-
nario of total wage flexibility in which the second-round effects 
on prices of an inflationary shock are cancelled out, such that 
both in the Spanish economy and in the rest of the euro area 
wage indexation disappears and wages are revised each quar-
ter (this counterfactual scenario is rather extreme, therefore the 
quantifications obtained should be viewed with caution). In this 
case, the negative impact on GDP and employment in Spain 
would be smaller, because wages fall in the face of the decline 
in activity and employment, enabling the outcome of the shock 
to be a lesser adjustment in employment, and therefore also in 
GDP. As a result, faced with the same rise in oil prices simulated 
before, under this scenario of total flexibility 85,000 more jobs 
would be maintained, that is to say, approximately half the jobs 
would be destroyed in the second year as would be under the 
scenario with rigidities. In the case of the rest of the euro area, 
the differences between the two scenarios are smaller, since the 
degree of price and wage flexibility prevailing is closer to the 
counterfactual scenario of wage flexibility.
BOX 1.1THE ROLE OF PRICE AND WAGE FLEXIBILITY IN THE ADJUSTMENT OF THE SPANISH ECONOMY WITHIN
THE EURO AREA (cont’d)
1  There are more detailed analyses of the Spanish financial system and of its restructuring and recapitalisation in 
other specialist Banco de España publications such as the Financial Stability Report and the Report on Banking 
Supervision in Spain.
As indicated, over the past year reforms have been undertaken in three major areas: the 
restructuring and recapitalisation of the financial system1; fiscal consolidation; and struc-
tural reforms. The reform drive must persist and further progress must be made in these 
three closely interconnected areas. 
In the financial area, the imbalances accumulated in a part of the banking sector (es-
pecially in certain institutions in the savings banks sector) led as early as 2009 to the 
adoption of measures aimed at prompting substantial write-downs along with the re-
structuring and recapitalisation of the segment, which is where investors’ loss of con-
fidence tended to concentrate. At the core of these imbalances were problems of ex-
cessive size, excessive concentration of real estate exposures and high dependency 
on wholesale market funding. Further compounding these imbalances were the diffi-
culties arising from certain singular features of savings banks that have magnified the 
perception of these institutions’ vulnerability: their particular ownership structure, an 
insufficiently robust corporate governance model, difficulties in raising top-quality 
capital on the markets and the complexities which, compared with other credit institu-
tions, arise from a legal framework that sees measures taken at both State and re-
gional government levels.
In 2009 the Fund for the Orderly Restructuring of the Banking Sector (FROB) was created. 
Its dual aim was to resolve in an orderly fashion potential situations of bank non-viability, 
and to pave the way for integration processes between viable institutions. In this latter 
case, financial support from the FROB was conditional upon the submission of an integra-
tion plan, containing the business and restructuring plans, which had to be approved by 
In the past year there has 
been a shift in the economic 
policy stance in three major 
areas 
In the financial area, a far-
reaching process of write-
downs, restructuring and 
recapitalisation is taking place.
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the Banco de España (Box 1.2 offers greater details on the FROB and on the other meas-
ures discussed below). 
The first wave of the sovereign debt crisis in spring last year entailed a widespread loss of 
investor confidence which, owing to the reasons indicated, particularly affected a group of 
countries of which Spain was part. Ultimately, these circumstances highlighted the need 
to speed through integration processes, so as to achieve synergies allowing cost cuts, the 
idea being to create better managed and more efficient institutions with a greater volume 
of assets that would be better placed to raise funding on the markets. The reaction was 
swift and took the form of the approval of a significant number of integration operations, 
most with the financial support of the FROB, which affected a highly significant portion of 
the savings bank subsector. As a result, the number of savings banks or groups of savings 
banks in this subsector has, as at the end of May, fallen from 45 to 18, while the integration 
plans approved envisage significant reductions in both the number of branches and in 
staff levels at the institutions involved. 
In summer 2010 the highly detailed results of the stress tests conducted in coordination at 
the European level were published. In Spain’s case the tests covered listed banks and all 
savings banks. The results showed that the Spanish financial system as a whole could 
withstand relatively unlikely extreme shocks, and that only four groups of savings banks 
would not, in the event the assumptions materialised, manage to maintain the levels of 
capitalisation required in the tests. 
The restructuring and recapitalisation drive undertaken, along with the write-downs made 
by the institutions, were an appropriate response to savings banks’ problems of excessive 
size and accumulation of risks, as confirmed by the stress tests. At the same time, savings 
bank reform legislation was passed in summer 2010, the main aim of which was to im-
prove the governance of these institutions and their ability to raise own funds on capital 
markets. 
These measures were also boosted by others taken at around the same time at the Euro-
pean (the financial support mechanisms and the unconventional monetary policy meas-
ures) and Spanish (fiscal consolidation and labour market reform) levels. Tensions began 
to abate after the summer and investor confidence started to pick up. There was thus a 
reduction in the risk premia on assets issued by the public sector and by financial institu-
tions, and a gradual resumption of foreign capital flows.
However, this process was abruptly interrupted in the autumn as a result of the outbreak 
of the Irish banking crisis. Tellingly, as this episode was centred on the banking sector, it 
proved particularly harmful to the savings bank restructuring and recapitalisation process. 
The fact that the two Irish banks that had participated in and passed the aforementioned 
stress tests were an integral part of the problems substantially weakened investor confi-
dence in the results of the tests. Thereafter, bank funding costs once again began to rise 
and the difficulties in gaining access to the wholesale markets increased. Spanish credit 
institutions, and especially savings banks, thus saw how much of the headway made 
thanks to the previous reformist drive was lost. 
In November, the Banco de España imposed a particularly intense transparency exercise 
on savings banks to obtain a proper picture of their situation. Prior to end-January 2011, it 
published detailed data on their exposure to the real estate development and construction 
sector and on the volume of wholesale funding and their liquidity situation, the two factors 
The process is considered 
vital to tackle confidence 
problems that have been 
exacerbated by the sovereign 
debt crisis… 
… and later refuelled, again, 
by the tensions caused by the 
Irish banking crisis
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This box describes in some detail the main characteristics of the 
different measures adopted as part of the Spanish banking sys-
tem balance-sheet write-down, restructuring and recapitalisation 
process discussed in the main body of the text. The process be-
gan with the creation of the Fund for the Orderly Restructuring of 
the Banking System (FROB), further to Royal Decree-Law (RDL) 
9/2009 of 26 June 2009, which had a dual aim: to provide a solu-
tion for institutions that ceased to be viable, and to pave the way 
for integration processes involving viable institutions by promot-
ing their restructuring. The former aim has only been used in one 
instance (Cajasur), although before the creation of the FROB con-
trol was taken over another institution (Caja Castilla-La Mancha) 
through the participation of the Deposit Guarantee Fund. The 
overall weight of these two savings banks scarcely exceeded 1 % 
of the system’s total assets. The second aim was instrumented 
through the subscription by the FROB of convertible preference 
shares, equity units or contributions to the capital of credit coop-
eratives, for a maximum term of five years, extendible by a further 
two years, and earning a minimum return of 7.75 %.1 The aid was 
conditional upon the submission of an integration plan approved 
by the Banco de España. This second arrangement was instru-
mental in supporting eight savings bank integration processes, in 
which the FROB committed itself to aid totalling €10.07 billion 
(around 1 % of GDP).2 Together with a further four processes 
which have not required FROB participation, the resulting restruc-
turing has proven far-reaching, as the accompanying table 
shows.3 Overall4, 39 out of a total of 45 savings banks are in-
volved, accounting for 88 % of the assets of this subsector and 
32 % of those of the national banking system. The result is a re-
duction in the number of savings banks or groups of savings 
banks to 18, with an average size in terms of total assets of €70 
billion, almost 2.5 times greater than was previously the case. 
The integration plans approved also envisage a cut of between 
20 % and 25 % in the number of offices and of between 12 % 
and 18 % in staff. These developments have been accompanied 
by a substantial balance-sheet write-down drive which, for 
Spanish deposit institutions as a whole, has amounted to €96 
billion (9.5 % of GDP) in the three years from 2008 to 2010, as 
the accompanying chart shows. 
In spring 2010, stress tests coordinated at the European level 
were conducted. It was considered that the target level of core 
(Tier 1) capital institutions had to reach following the exercise 
was 6 % of risk-weighted assets (higher than the figure of 4 % in 
the regulations then prevailing). In Spain, the exercise was con-
ducted covering 90 % of the system’s total assets. The results, 
which were disclosed in extensive detail in late July, highlighted 
the resilience of most Spanish institutions since only four groups 
of savings banks required additional capital, for a total of €1.84 
billion, under the adverse scenario. In spring 2011 a similar exer-
cise has been conducted, the results of which are expected to be 
published in June.
In July last year, the government approved the reform of the sav-
ings bank law by means of RDL 11/2010. The aim was to tackle the 
two structural weaknesses in the sector, linked to its singular legal 
structure, which have become clearly manifest during the crisis: 
BOX 1.2SPANISH BANKING SYSTEM BALANCE-SHEET WRITE-DOWNS, RESTRUCTURING AND RECAPITALISATION: 
THE MAIN STEPS TO DATE
SAVINGS BANK RESTRUCTURING PROCESSES
Participating 
institutions
Final 
institutions
Total assets 
(€ m) (a)
Assets as 
% of 
savings 
banks total
Assets as 
% of 
banking 
system 
total (b)
Integration processes 
with FROB aid
33 9 (4 SIP) 863,353 68.1 24.8
Integration processes 
without FROB aid
7 3 (1 SIP) 330,263 26.1 9.5
Total restructuring ( c) 40 12 (5 SIP) 1,193,616 94.2 34.3
Other 5 5 73,452 5.8 2.1
Total savings banks 45 17 1,267,068 100 36.4
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AGAINST RESERVES OF SAVINGS BANKS UNDERGOING RESTRUCTURING 
PROVISIONS SET ASIDE SINCE JANUARY 2008 
€ bn 
  
 
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a Consolidated balance sheet data as at 31.12.2010.
b Sum of national banking instituions' consolidated balance sheets.
c Including the restructuring of CCM, although in this case the traditional DGF framework was used.
1  The return shall be the higher of 7.75 % and the return on 5-year Spanish 
public debt plus 500 bp at the time of approval of the operation and shall 
increase by 15 bp each year up to the fifth year, and by 100 bp for each 
additional year if the operation is extended.
2  These figures do not include the initial Banco Base IPS (Institutional Pro-
tection Scheme) project, for which aid totalling €1.49 billion (making for 
a total of €11.56 billion) was envisaged, and which was finally not grant-
ed. The two institutions or groups resulting from this collapsed project 
have reconsidered their recapitalisation strategies in accordance with 
the new requirements laid down in RDL 2/2011.
3   Integration processes have also taken place between other institutions 
in the Spanish financial system (commercial banks and credit coopera-
tives) in the form of voluntary initiatives aimed at improving efficiency. 
4  Taking into account the collapse of the Banco Base IPS project.
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governance problems and a limited capacity to raise high-quality 
capital. As regards the former, more restrictive limits were placed 
on the presence of general government representatives on the gov-
erning bodies of savings banks, who were further required to dem-
onstrate their professional suitability. To redress the second short-
coming, a more attractive legal regime was introduced for equity 
units, and the legal structures through which savings banks may 
provide their financial services were broadened, allowing them to 
pursue their financial activity through public limited companies with 
the category of commercial banks, either through Institutional Pro-
tection Schemes (IPSs) or through the creation of a commercial 
bank to which their financial business would be transferred. 
Also in summer 2010, the Banco de España issued a circular 
(CBE 3/2010) amending the accounting rules for provisioning, with 
three aims in mind: to recognise the value of different real estate 
guarantees according to the type of asset involved, but applying 
substantial precautionary haircuts and shortening the period over 
which provisioning is made for the risk as a whole; to increase the 
minimum provisioning charges for foreclosed assets, which de-
pend both on appraisals and on the passage of time; and to en-
courage the setting of greater prudential margins for the granting 
of loans. Later (in November), the central bank required savings 
banks to publish detailed information on their exposures and pro-
visioning, especially exposures to the real estate sector, on the 
volume of wholesale funding and on their liquidity situation, which 
they duly did before the end of January 2011. That same month, all 
banks were formally required to incorporate this information into 
their 2010 financial statements. 
On 18 February 2011, the government approved RDL 2/2011. 
This legislation increased the minimum capital level required of 
banks, introducing a new solvency ratio that must be met main-
taining common equity Tier 1 capital5 of at least 8 % of risk-
weighted assets, and raising this ratio to 10 % for those institu-
tions in which the relative weight of funding from wholesale mar-
kets exceeds 20 % and which have not placed at least 20 % of 
their capital with third-party investors. The functioning of the 
FROB was also reformed so that it may be used to recapitalise 
those institutions that cannot meet these requirements by tap-
ping the markets. Specifically, the FROB is authorised to sub-
scribe ordinary shares under market conditions, which it must 
sell before five years have elapsed, provided that the institution 
submits a recapitalisation plan for approval by the Banco de Es-
paña. In these cases, the FROB shall take a seat on the board of 
directors of the institution affected. If a savings bank or savings 
bank integration process by means of an IPS is involved, all 
lending activity must be transferred to a bank by one of the 
means provided for in RDL 11/2010. The new requirements have 
to be met by September this year, although an extension of three 
months, extendible to six months in the case of market listing 
processes, may be requested. On 10 March 2011, the Banco de 
España made known the capital requirements arising from the 
new regulations, with the result that 12 institutions (two Spanish 
banks, two subsidiaries of foreign banks and eight savings 
banks) evidenced additional capital needs for a total amount of 
€15.15 billion (€14.08 billion of which relating to savings banks). 
On 14 April the Banco de España approved the strategies for 
complying with these new capital requirements. In the case of 
the institutions participating in the original Banco Base IPS, sep-
arate strategies have been submitted for the capital require-
ments of the two institutions or groups of institutions resulting 
from the collapsed project. On 28th April, within the legally stipu-
lated term, the institutions or groups of institutions that have re-
quested from the FROB, as the primary source, the funds they 
need to meet these capital requirements, submitted their recapi-
talisation plans. Thereafter, the measures envisaged in the new 
RDL 2/2011 have continued to be pursued both by the Banco de 
España and by the FROB so as to comply with the formalities 
and schedules laid down. 
SPANISH BANKING SYSTEM BALANCE-SHEET WRITE-DOWNS, RESTRUCTURING AND RECAPITALISATION: 
THE MAIN STEPS TO DATE (cont’d)
BOX 1.2
5  This definition is stricter than the above-mentioned core (Tier 1) capital 
and is based on the Basel III concept applicable in 2013, with some 
amendments.
perceived by markets as the main factors of risk of savings banks. In turn, in February 
2011 the government approved a Royal Decree-Law whereby the minimum levels of sol-
vency required of all banks were raised and the FROB was authorised to acquire, tempo-
rarily and subject to approval by the Banco de España of a recapitalisation plan, shares in 
the capital stock of those institutions that could not obtain the funds required on the mar-
ket within the period established. Capital requirements have been raised to a greater de-
gree for institutions in whose capital there is not sufficient participation by third-party in-
vestors and which are more reliant on wholesale markets, and it has also been stipulated 
that recourse to the FROB by a savings bank shall entail the transfer of its business to a 
bank, which would translate into a substantial change, inter alia, in its corporate govern-
ance regime and in its possibilities of gaining access to capital markets. 
The aim of this new set of measures, along with the forthcoming publication of the results 
of the new European stress tests, is to contribute decisively to restoring international 
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investor confidence in our financial system, reducing the risk of an extension of the ten-
sions that might undermine the recovery of the Spanish economy. 
In the budgetary domain, the government approved a package of deficit-cutting measures 
for 2010 and 2011 in May, supplementing the 2010 Budget (the withdrawal of some of the 
extraordinary expansionary measures, in force during the crisis, and a VAT rise from 1 July, 
among others). The May package involved an additional cut in spending of around 1.5 % 
of GDP for these two years, whereby the deficit-reduction path was set at 9.3 % of GDP, 
6 % of GDP and 4.4 % of GDP in 2010, 2011 and 2012, respectively. 
The consolidation strategy defined by the government brought forward the bulk of the ad-
justment to the 2010-2011 period, underpinning it with spending cuts, many of which struc-
tural, including most notably the cut in public-sector employees’ compensation from June 
2010, the reduction in public investment, the freeze on public-sector wages and pensions in 
2011, and the 10% ceiling on the rate of replacement of public-sector employees. The State 
budget for 2011 validated these measures, introduced further cuts to other budgetary items 
and provided for specific tax rises (a tax rise in the State personal income tax tranche for 
incomes above €120,000 and the elimination of the tax deduction for purchase of the ha-
bitual dwelling for incomes above €24,170.2). The Updated Stability Plan for the period 
2010-2014, which the government approved on 29 April, confirmed the above-mentioned 
path of adjustment to 2013 and further set a deficit target for 2014 of 2.1% of GDP, which 
would be compatible with a public debt/GDP ratio of 68.9%. Accordingly, if the targets of the 
proposed consolidation plan are met, the deficit will embark on a declining course in 2014.
The public finances outcome at end-2010, entailing a general government deficit equiva-
lent to 9.2 % of GDP and a public debt ratio of 60.1 % of GDP, show that the measures 
adopted in 2010 have proven effective in reversing the upward trajectory of the budget 
deficit. They do, however, involve an uneven budgetary adjustment drive across the differ-
ent tiers of government: while the State cut its deficit by 4.3 pp (to 5 % of GDP), the re-
gional governments’ shortfall increased by 1.4 pp (to 3.4 %). The Social Security fiscal 
position also worsened by 1 pp, posting a deficit of 0.2 %. 
The fiscal projections for 2011 and 2012 by the Banco de España as part of the annual mac-
roeconomic projections exercise suggest some risks of deviations from the consolidation 
path. The projected reduction in the deficit is based on macroeconomic projections which, if 
they are not confirmed, might translate into a less favourable performance by revenue. Fur-
thermore, potential deviations at the territorial government level cannot be ruled out. 
The fiscal consolidation programme is a centrepiece of the overall economic policy strat-
egy, whose success hinges on a major budgetary effort that is unprecedented in terms of 
its size and extension to all levels of general government. In meeting these targets it will 
not be possible to count on the help of other potential sources of improvement that were 
present during the expansionary phase. On one hand, the extraordinary revenue linked to 
the real estate boom will not be resuming and, on the other, neither the business cycle, 
which is following a very gradual pattern of recovery, nor the interest burden, which has 
already moved onto a rising course, will help improve public finances. 
To prevent the risks of a deviation from the fiscal consolidation path materialising, it is 
necessary to set in place sound foundations for the reduction of the deficit and the control 
of medium- and long-term debt, in line with the proposals made in Chapter 2 of this report, 
which focuses on this matter. It is crucial to involve all levels of government in the fiscal 
Turning to fiscal policy, a 
demanding budgetary 
consolidation strategy was 
defined for 2010 and 2011,…
… bringing forward the 
adjustment drive envisaged for 
2013 to the 2010-2011 period. 
It was based predominantly on 
structural spending cuts
The fiscal projections for 2011 
and 2012 point to some risks 
of deviations …
… and averting this will require 
action by all levels of 
government and a strengthening 
of the budgetary stability rules
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consolidation process, to strengthen the institutional commitment to budgetary stability 
and the mechanisms for enforcing the rules, to increase the transparency of public fi-
nances and to reinforce budgetary planning in the medium term. 
The application of structural reforms providing for enhanced employment generation and 
growth capacity is crucial for embedding a durable recovery and facilitating fiscal adjust-
ment (see Box 1.3). Supply-side policies that improve the working of the markets for 
goods, services and factors are vital to pave the way for a durable expansion of activity 
and employment; and, therefore, to also increase government revenue and, through this 
means, to promote the medium-term sustainability of public finances. In turn, an appropri-
ate distribution of the adjustment drive between public spending and revenue would con-
tribute to boosting activity and would have positive effects on employment. 
The reform of the pensions system, the draft legislation for which was submitted to Parlia-
ment in March 2011, is an example of measures that harness the complementarity be-
tween the sustainability of public finances and the creation of favourable structural condi-
tions on the supply side. The reform approved in Spain amends certain parameters of the 
system, raising the legal retirement age and increasing the number of years taken into 
account to calculate pensions. The combination of both measures could, on one hand, 
increase participation by more elderly workers and thus raise growth potential; and, on the 
other, it could enhance the sustainability of the pensions system and contribute to the re-
structuring of public finances (see Box 2.3). 
The labour market reform approved last year (Law 35/2010 of 17 September 2010) took 
certain steps towards improving the functioning of the labour market in the medium term. 
In terms of internal flexibility, one aim of the reform was for companies to be able to 
change certain aspects of how work was organised (in particular regarding the conditions 
for setting wages) compared to what was stipulated in industry-, region- and nationwide 
collective bargaining agreements; that would bring about a more decentralised model, al-
lowing a closer relationship to be established between working conditions and the spe-
cific needs of companies. However, this would all be done without yet altering the collec-
tive bargaining system. In turn, in the case of hiring mechanisms, changes were made to 
the modalities already in place in order to boost permanent hiring (facilitating the possi-
bilities of terminating permanent contracts for objective causes and extending the possi-
bility of using employment-promoting contracts), while new limits were added in the case 
of temporary hires. On the whole, these are so far partial measures that do not alter the key 
features of the labour framework, such as hiring and collective bargaining arrangements, 
and they cannot therefore decisively change its present functioning. 
Any assessment of the impact of these measures would be premature. The as yet very 
partial information available points to an increase in employment-promoting contracts 
which, however, would appear to have crowded out other permanent contracts, while the 
impact on temporary employment is not yet discernible. Also evident is a greater use of 
objective dismissals, with lower severance costs, and a greater use by companies of the 
possibilities to reduce the working day, on a temporary basis. Some time will be needed to 
accurately ascertain the link between the changes being observed and the effectiveness 
of the steps taken. 
The behaviour of employment continues to be the source of most concern in the economy, 
and the wage rises observed in the opening months of the year indicate that the measures 
already taken must be complemented by far-reaching reforms to collective bargaining and 
Fiscal consolidation must be 
accompanied by an ambitious 
structural reform programme
The pensions reform approved 
in March this year has positive 
effects on the sustainability of 
public finances and growth 
potential 
Labour market reform remains 
one of the fundamental 
economic policy measures 
needed …
… and it should go ahead with 
substantial changes to the 
collective bargaining system …
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BOX 1.3
The substantial fiscal consolidation the Spanish economy needs 
to correct the budgetary imbalances arising from the crisis faces 
various problems; compounding the difficulties derived from the 
very scale of the imbalances are further complications due to 
growth expectations limited by the depth and extension of the 
crisis and by the impact of population ageing on spending on 
social policies. These are major obstacles standing in the way of 
public finances sustainability. In such a situation, a factor of great 
importance is the complementarity of fiscal consolidation policy 
and supply-side policies which, by improving the functioning of 
the markets for goods, services and factors, may lead to an ex-
pansion in potential growth, increasing public revenue and allow-
ing certain spending items to be reduced. 
To illustrate the effects that fiscal consolidation and structural 
reforms have on GDP and public debt in the short and medium 
term, this box presents simulations performed using a calibrated 
model for Spain that has two essential ingredients. First, in line 
with the standard approach in much of the recent economic lit-
erature1, the model incorporates distortions in the labour and 
product markets, in the form of monopolistic competition, which 
give rise to a gap between marginal costs and prices and to the 
inefficient allocation of productive factors. Second, so as to 
capture the impact on the economy of population ageing, the 
model’s demographic structure is highly detailed, in the form of 
overlapping generations of households.2
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SOURCE: Banco de España.
a The variables depicted have been normalised taking their 2010 value.
b The dependency rate is dejned as the ratio of the over-65 population to the working-age population (16-64).
1  See, for example, L. J. Christiano, M. Eichebaum and C. L. Evans (2005), 
“Nominal Rigidities and the Dynamic Effects of a Shock to Monetary 
Policy”, Journal of Political Economy, 113 (1), pp. 1-45.
2  For a detailed description of the model and its calibration, see A. Gavi-
lán, P. Hernández de Cos, J. F. Jimeno and J. A. Rojas (2011), “Fiscal 
Policy, Structural Reforms and External Imbalances: A Quantitative Eval-
uation for Spain”, Moneda y Crédito, forthcoming.
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BOX 1.3FISCAL CONSOLIDATION AND STRUCTURAL REFORMS (cont’d)
Panels 1 and 2 show the response of GDP and of the public 
debt/GDP ratio from 2010 under different scenarios. The base-
line scenario incorporates a public spending trajectory for the 
period 2009-2013 in line with that established in the April 2011 
Stability Programme. It further entails the continuation of the fis-
cal consolidation process after 2014, whereby the public debt/
GDP ratio in 2020 settles at 60 %. This scenario does not, how-
ever, consider the introduction of structural reforms. Before ad-
dressing the potential impact of these reforms, and to assess 
the significance of the time path of the adjustment, this scenario 
is compared with the so-called “Slow Consolidation” scenario, 
in which the effects of cutting future budget deficits more mod-
erately, again in the absence of structural reforms, are simulat-
ed. As can be seen in Panels 1 and 2, a slower fiscal adjustment 
than that considered in the baseline scenario would entail a sig-
nificant delay in the stabilisation of the public debt/GDP ratio, 
without any benefits in terms of short-term growth. These re-
sults illustrate the advantages of the strategy of bringing the fis-
cal adjustment forward.
An assessment follows of the consequences of introducing 
structural reforms, for instance, those affecting the markets for 
goods and services. In the “Structural Reforms” scenario, it is 
assumed these reforms would narrow the prevailing margins be-
tween marginal costs and prices in the goods and services and 
labour markets by 2 pp3, and that they would increase the 
growth rate of productivity in the economy by 0.5 pp once the 
crisis were overcome.4 As can be seen in panels 1 and 2, the 
structural reforms considered, by reducing the distortions exist-
ing in the markets, would improve the allocation of resources, 
exert a significant positive impact on activity and make for a 
swifter improvement in public finances in the short and medium 
term, widening the fiscal policy room for manoeuvre. 
In the long run, the dynamics of activity and of public finances will 
be notably influenced by the population ageing currently charac-
terising Spain, and most other developed countries. With its high-
ly detailed demographic structure, the model used in this box can 
capture the impact of this ageing process on spending on pen-
sions and on labour supply, along with other general equilibrium 
effects on prices and wages. In this setting, the adoption of struc-
tural reforms would also have a considerable positive effect since, 
as shown in panel 3, it would significantly soften the effect of 
population ageing on growth (see panel 4). 
The results presented assume that the cost of financing for all do-
mestic agents (households, corporations and government) is inde-
pendent of the volume of debt in the economy. However, as was 
clear in the sovereign debt crisis episodes in 2010, the perception of 
international lenders may be that an economy’s risk of default rises 
with its volume of debt, and they may demand a growing premium in 
return. In this case, the advantages of undertaking structural reforms 
and accelerating fiscal consolidation would be even greater than 
those resulting from the simulations presented in this box. 
3  This reduction in margins is approximately equivalent to one-third of the 
competitive differences estimated in the literature across different coun-
tries. See, for example, J. Andres, E. Ortega and J. Vallés (2008), “Com-
petition and Inflation Differentials in EMU”, Journal of Economic Dynam-
ics and Control, 32 (3), pp. 848-874, and R. Christopoulou and P. 
Vermeulen (2008), “Markups in the Euro Area and the US over the Period 
1981-2004  −  A Comparison of 50 Sectors”, European Central Bank 
Working Paper Series, no. 856
4  The positive impact on productivity derived from regulatory improve-
ments in the goods and services and labour markets is empirically docu-
mented, for example, in G. Nicoletti and S. Scarpetta (2006), “Regulation 
and Economic Performance: Product Market Reforms and Productivity 
in the OECD”, in T. Eicher and C. García−Peñalosa (eds.), Institutions, 
Development and Growth, MIT Press, and A. Basanini, L. Nunziata and 
D. Venn (2009), “Job Protection Legislation and Productivity Growth in 
OECD Countries”, Economic Policy, 24 (58), pp. 349-402
active employment policies. The collective bargaining system in Spain concedes to infla-
tion a predominant role among wage-increase determinants. Also, bargaining is carried 
out at an intermediate level which foments highly uniform wage increases that are barely 
linked to the specific economic conditions of companies. This furthermore prevents rela-
tive wages from acting as a mechanism to allocate resources towards sectors with greater 
development potential. 
A more appropriate design of collective bargaining would help improve the capacity to 
redistribute employment across sectors, companies and regions, which would provide 
for a swifter exit from unemployment for the large number of jobless workers. An im-
provement here is vital, moreover, so as not to jeopardise the gains in competitiveness 
that have come about during the adjustment phase and so as to lay the foundations for 
a sound recovery in the economy. The increase in purchasing power that would ultimately 
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ensue as a result of this improvement in the competitive environment would also enable 
demand to be sustained. In sum, the appropriate functioning of the wage-setting mech-
anisms is a cornerstone of the capacity for macroeconomic adjustment within the euro 
area and of the structural change that the economy needs, following the serious shock 
it has undergone.
The changes should, moreover, be complemented by a far-reaching reform of active 
and passive unemployment policies, so as to help prevent the increase in unemploy-
ment from becoming structural. In this respect, the incentives of the benefits system 
should be reconsidered so as to make eligibility conditional upon active job search, 
complementing this with active policies aimed at enhancing training. The reforms ap-
proved in February 2011 are in this direction, although it is once again too soon to as-
sess their effects.
Some of the problems in our educational system, such as the high drop-out rates, can be 
found to be associated with the scant wage dispersion derived from our collective bar-
gaining system, which does not generate the right incentives for prolonging schooling.2 
However, improving human capital also requires significant steps to be taken in the edu-
cational system, including lifelong training.
The Spanish economy would be better placed to bring about a change in the productive 
model that has prevailed over the last business cycle if the design of the educational 
system and of labour institutions were to appropriately encourage companies’ and 
workers’ training decisions, to provide for job mobility across firms and industries, and 
to increase the capacity for adjustment in the face of the various shocks the economy 
may undergo, assigning less weight to employment fluctuations over the course of the 
business cycle. 
In recent years there has been a notable drive to liberalise and deregulate the market for 
goods and services, but there is room to take some of the measures already undertaken 
further and to launch new reforms.
In the housing market, house rentals as opposed to house purchases should continue 
to be encouraged. A more balanced market will pave the way for the provision of hous-
ing services under more favourable conditions, it will contribute to absorbing the ex-
cess capacity in the residential sector and it will provide for job mobility, which is es-
sential for infusing dynamism into the adjustment of the labour market across regions 
and industries. To this end, the latest initiatives adopted – such as greater legal effi-
ciency in tenancy-related proceedings and the elimination of the tax deduction for in-
comes above €24,000, equating it to the rental deduction – should be complemented 
by measures aimed at adding flexibility to the mandatory term of contracts and the 
control of rental incomes. 
The most substantial progress in structural reforms in recent years has been in connec-
tion with the liberalisation of the services sector, among others, and with the lessening 
of administrative burdens, further to the transposition of the Services Directive. How-
ever, obstacles remain in respect of the liberalisation of certain activities, such as retail-
ing, where the regional governments can continue to establish administrative authorisation 
… complemented by a far-
reaching reform of active and 
passive unemployment 
policies 
Increasing the quality of 
human capital requires 
substantial improvements on 
the educational front …
… and the drive to liberalise 
and deregulate the markets for 
goods and services must 
continue 
2  See A. de la Fuente and J. F. Jimeno (2009), «The Private and Fiscal Returns to Schooling in the European Un-
ion», Journal of the European Economic Association, December, vol. 7, no. 6, pp. 1319-1360.
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“for reasons in the general interest”. Such reasons may ultimately interfere in the alloca-
tion of productive resources and price-setting. In addition, the reform of professional 
services should advance along the same liberalising path, given the significance of this 
sector in Spain and the numerous obstacles in place compared with those in other 
countries. 
Turning to the network industries, there remain segments in telecommunications in 
which certain rigidities and limited progress in the degree of competition are discerni-
ble, specifically in those most closely connected to the new communications technolo-
gies (broadband). In the energy industry, the degree of de facto competition is also 
scant and final prices should be more closely aligned to costs in order to bring about by 
means of incentives a reduction in our energy dependence. In the fuel distribution mar-
ket, further steps are needed to eliminate the barriers to entry and to the expansion of 
new operators, in line with the recommendations of the National Competition Board 
(CNC by its Spanish acronym). As to transport, there is scope for liberalising rail trans-
port, in particular freight.
Lastly, while the general government technology investment drive has increased con-
siderably, the carryover effect of public funding into private investment seems rather 
limited; accordingly, Spain’s relative lag in technological and scientific production has, 
overall, scarcely been corrected. In this respect, it would be advisable to improve gov-
ernance of the public research system and the mechanisms for managing incentives to 
R+D+i. 
